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For most of recorded human history, people have been concerned about
what constitutes freedom, equality, fairness, and justice. In different eras,
and different places, these ideas have had radically different answers. Any
attempt to produce a grand historical account of what constitutes justice,
for example, would have to deal with the many ways in which treating
people justly has involved killing, torturing, enslaving, ostracizing, or
exiling them. Human equality and human freedom were similarly depen-
dent on either your identity or on any sins or crimes against gods or the
social body for which you were deemed responsible. To talk of human
rights as transhistorical phenomena only works, as a result, if we see them
asmoral (not empirical) claims, arguing that people have always had these
rights in principle, whatever the reality. We have not created them; we
have simply discovered them. Our forebears were either unenlightened or
morally wrong. In this way, talk of empirical human rights cannot draw
sustenance from the past except through reverse engineering. Some
people historically may have held rights-like ideas, but “human
rights” – rights that attach to all individuals on account of their simply
being human – are one of our era’s distinctive ideologies about right, fair
and just treatment. They are reﬂective of a – perhaps the – deﬁning feature
of Western-style modernity: the emergence of the idea of rational, auton-
omous, self-governing individuals as the primary building blocks of poli-
tical and social life and as the fundamental source of moral value. This
shift has only happened in a serious way in the last two hundred or so
years.
Because classic human rights are, in this sense, individual entitle-
ments held against each other and against collective authorities, the
emphasis in most arguments for rights is on the primacy of personal
choice in terms of beliefs, commitments, lifestyle, and identity. This is
captured in the idea of rights as trumps: winning cards in the game of life
that individuals can play against any attempt to regulate, prohibit, mis-
treat, or disadvantage them in the name of broader social or political
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goals, or the interests of other people.1 Human rights make us all ends,
not means, to paraphrase Kant. They carve out an inviolable and perso-
nalized private sphere. As such, they are integrally about a conception of
the person who exists in some way prior to her social bonds, morally
complete in and of herself. We need society to live in a practical sense,
but this necessity is secondary in moral terms. That is, what has priority
in a human rights world organized according to the classic conception of
human rights are the lives and choices of individual human beings, not
the degree to which the doctrines of nations, families, tribes, and gods
are brought to life in the lives of those same individuals. Any theory of
human rights that does not put this person ﬁrst – that on principle (not
as a lack, or oversight) allows discrimination or curtails personal choice –
cannot be said to be consistent with the core inner logic of classical
human rights claims, either conceptually or in their dominant historical
form. How could an advocate of human rights accept any form of dis-
crimination, unequal treatment, or unequal moral status on principle?
How could any human rights agreement include such principles? Equal
moral worth – and, as a logical consequence, prima facie equal indivi-
dual autonomy over personal choice – are the founding principles of
human rights claims. If we look at the world around us today, we see this
is still a radical, even heretical, claim to make in many if not most
societies.
This classic conception is not, nor has it ever been, the only option.
Many places have vibrant civil societies pushing for justice, fairness, and
social change – just not in the language of individual human rights
(much less the idea of personal trump cards). The normative under-
pinnings of rights are distinct in giving social and political supremacy to
the interests and choices of individuals. The classic conception does
tend, it is true, to marginalize other sorts of rights claims. Demands for
social and economic rights, as well as cultural and collective rights (e.g.,
the right to national self-determination), have always been part of the
general rights discourse, with social and economic rights increasingly
prominent in our era. But these claims do not map easily onto the
individualist logic of the classic conception. And so they raise a critical
issue of priority: for believers in the classic conception, individual rights
must always come ﬁrst. The collective can only legitimately claim to
trump the interests of the individual person for three reasons: to prevent
harm to others, to ensure the survival of the community as a whole, and
for the best interests of the individual concerned. Even then, the bar is
set high, the action’s legitimacy will be hotly contested, and the language
1 The idea of rights as trumps is indelibly associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin.
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of rights will merely be temporarily suspended until the classic concep-
tion reasserts itself as the norm.
I’ll suggest, in Section 1, that this classic conception has until now
dominated the theory and politics of human rights, having all but mono-
polized rights thinking in the West. And it is Western power, for better or
worse, that built the modern international system of which our current
global norms and rules are integral parts. This reﬂects not a uniﬁed view
in “the West,” but a very speciﬁc sort of ideology that closely mirrors the
broad needs and interests of the (middle-class) social forces that have
outsize inﬂuence on life within Western societies. This raises an impor-
tant question: If the momentum for globalizing human rights relies on the
rights-sensitivity of growing middle classes in China and India, will
these classes prove revolutionary or will they seek to support a narrower
range of individual rights that mirror their interests? Section 2 considers
this question, asking what implications anymove to a post-Western world
might have for the future of human rights in terms of state resistance.
Section 3 looks at responses to human rights in terms of social ambiva-
lence. Just as the middle classes are undergoing rapid change in Western
societies, so the utility of human rights ideas as a legitimating ideology for
those classes is under pressure in areas such as civil liberties and
immigration.
Finally, I suggest that in this story we can see the structural limits to
human rights-led progress. This has two elements. First, human rights
do – as they are supposed to – strike at core aspects of sovereignty. But
they have no means to make this demand for state compliance stick in the
long run, beyond aiding and abetting the growth of internal and transna-
tional forces that edge the state in that direction. The battle that must be
won ﬁrst is political and cultural, not legal, although these are interlinked
struggles. A functioning and reasonably stable international system is
a precondition for any form of generalized normative progress. Even
then, there is much human rights law states can simply ignore, especially
if they are powerful (the United States, China, Russia, India) or strategi-
cally important (Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Turkey).
Second, how effective social forces are, and their direction of travel,
depends crucially on whether or not the middle class moves in
a progressive direction. My hypothesis here is that, other things being
equal, members of the middle classes by deﬁnition enjoy many social and
economic opportunities without the need for human rights, and when
they do not, they seek only those rights that will ﬁll gaps in their own
power. Chinese voters may demand more political rights over time, they
may even be supportive of women’s and LGBT rights, but they will not
seek large-scale redistribution of their new wealth. Neither will the Indian
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middle class. They’ll prefer to work on international issues such as human
trafﬁcking rather than see their own power and leverage dissipated.
Whichever way you look at it, social and economic rights will always be
more attractive for those currently without capital. A class struggle
emerges between the purveyors of civil and political rights and those of
social and economic rights, in other words.
1 Human Rights as a Western-led Normative Project
There is nothing inherently Western about ideas like rights, or their
successor concept human rights. Any society or civilization could have
developed similar ideas in theory. It is simply the case that it was in the
West (meaning Europe, followed by its settler colonies) that this ubi-
quitous modern ideology came to fruition in the particular sense of
becoming an important part of the legal and cultural fabric and of having
real political consequences. Moreover, human rights are obviously not the
only way to be moral. There is much in the doctrines of Islam, Judaism,
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity, for example, or in socialist
demands for equality, or in conservative claims about the responsibil-
ities of community, that is socially and morally valuable and/or progres-
sive but which never mentions rights or human rights (often preferring
the idea of “right” and its antithesis, “wrong”). The fact remains that it
is human rights that have assumed the status of a modern orthodoxy at
the level of international norms, succeeding Christianity in this aspira-
tion to be universal. And the reason for this is that the dominant powers
in the international system have until recently been Western liberal-
democratic (and Christian) powers – Western and Northern Europe,
the United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and even
Latin America, where legal and political systems as well as cultural and
social institutions have been heavily marked by European inﬂuence,
beginning with Christianity. In the Latin American case, human rights
have been extremely important, even if they were also systematically
abused by governments for much of the latter part of the twentieth
century.
In other words, as historically situated normative innovations, there is
little doubt that theWest is where wemust locate the drive for institutions
that embed human rights globally. This does not mean that only
Westerners (however we deﬁne such a problematic term) can hold those
ideas – such a claim would be ridiculous, absurd, immoral, and empiri-
cally and historically false. It does not mean that a majority of Westerners
actually believe in these ideas or enact them, as the callousmoral failure of
European states and societies to do more for destitute Syrian refugees
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amply demonstrates. It does not mean that Western states are not guilty
of breathtaking hypocrisy and despicable historical crimes. It simply
means that the global impact of human rights in international politics in the
post-1945 era is explained mostly by speciﬁcally liberal social modernization
efforts (e.g., democratization) that Western states have through their greater
relative power attempted to globalize, especially since the 1970s. Not always, of
course, but predominantly. Even if the expansion of human rights claims
in the postwar period owes a great deal to innovations in the Global
South, especially in former colonies, it is at the point that they were
prioritized by Western states, and particularly the United States, that
they became a signiﬁcant feature of the international political system.
Rights arguments were not enough. Power was essential.2 These human
rights were not necessarily adopted as aspects of Western foreign policies
for human rights reasons: the spread of a particular kind of liberal indivi-
dualism is just as much the ideology of hegemonic forms of capitalism
emanating from theWest as it is of any genuinely moral urge. It also does
not mean that human rights and the institutional manifestations to which
they give rise cannot, once established, be owned, changed, claimed, and
otherwise used outside the West. It is simply a claim about their political
origins and institutionalization thus far. Indeed, we may be living through
the change and it is to the possible implications of that change I want to
draw attention.
Major human rights innovations show this inﬂuence. Where are the
major institutions of the international human rights regime? Geneva,
TheHague, NewYork.Where are themajor global human rights NGOs?
Add London and Washington to the list. The UDHR may have had
a remarkable array of states and individuals inputting into it, and it does
reﬂect a much broader array of rights – social and economic as well as
civil and political – than the classic conception. But who were its primary
drafters? Rene Cassin, Eleanor Roosevelt, Charles Malik (a Lebanese
Christian and Heidegger student whose commitment to the dignity of
the individual was anchored in his religious faith), and John Humphrey,
a Canadian international civil servant.3 Where have regional human
rights conventions and courts been most inﬂuential? Europe and the
Americas.
2 On the importance of theGlobal South in the emergence of human rights ideas after 1945,
see Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights; The 1960s,
Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2016).
3 For an excellent discussion of Malik and an assessment of the claim he was a Westernized
liberal, see Joe Hoover, “Remembering Charles H. Malik,” (February 2011), at: http://
thedisorderofthings.com/2011/02/09/remembering-charles-h-malik/.
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Western Europe is routinely behind the Human Rights Council’s
strongest resolutions and is now the main funder of the International
Criminal Court.4 Of the P5, only the UK and France have ratiﬁed the
Rome Statute. The United States, while ambivalent about the ICC, has
been consistently committed (at least, in principle) to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.5 Which states took up the landmines
treaty, or the Arms Trade Treaty, the ICC, and R2P? How many Asian
or Middle Eastern states are members of the ICC? What is Africa’s
relationship with the ICC like? Who stands most squarely behind R2P?
We can even see theWest more narrowly, as Europe with Canada and the
unpredictable engagement of the United States (sympathetic in principle,
at least pre-Trump, conﬂicted in practice). Which countries in the
Human Rights Council routinely lead resistance to the demands of
Russia and China? European states. Who has pushed hardest for an
international criminal investigation in Sri Lanka, or in North Korea?
Europe and the United States. This normative architecture has been
constructed under the hegemony of the West however much (or little)
buy-in there has been from other states.
These rights are generally in sympathy with the political cultures of the
modernizing industrial societies fromwhich they emerged, and have been
part of Western liberal discourse in broad terms dating back to the idea of
natural rights (the clearest precursors to human rights). Indeed, they have
come to dominate liberal discourse, relegating the utilitarian strain of
liberalism culturally (if not practically) to marginal status. Human rights
are not the only progressive doctrine that aims to combat injustice, nor
were all the founders of human rights ideasWestern. But from theUDHR
onward, and especially since the 1970s, there has been a Western-led
drive to globalize them for ideological and Realpolitik reasons.
It is important to note that human rights claims, while seeming to be
merely political, in fact have deeper philosophical roots. There is a clear
4 Stuart Ford, “How Leadership in International Criminal Law Is Shifting from the US to
Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on and Contributions to International
Criminal Courts,” Saint Louis University Law Journal vol. 55 (2010): 953–1000.
5 “Remarks by President Obama in address to the United Nations General Assembly,
September 24, 2014,” at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2014/09/24/remarks-
president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly. In this speech, it is note-
worthy, however, that while President Obama mentioned “human rights” twice, he did
so by referring to the UDHR once and then by quoting Eleanor Roosevelt. At no point did
he directly reference his commitment, nor that of US foreign policy, to protect and
promote “human rights” per se. Indeed, in mentioning the UDHR he characterized its
mission, along with that of the UN as a whole, as “the notion that peace is not merely the
absence of war, but the presence of a better life.” This is a statement of such generality no
one could object. It is doubtful any statement even of this sort will be forthcoming from
President Trump.
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conception of the person underlying them. Thus, at the heart ofWestern-
stylemodernity lies whatMacpherson called “the possessive individual.”6
Themoral superiority of claims to children’s, women’s, and LGBT rights
is self-evident on this view and any social, cultural, or political norm that
doesn’t respect the fully autonomous individual must, again on this view,
be regarded as wrong. That’s the bottom line. The veil? Female genital
mutilation (FGM)? Unspeakable wrongs, from the perspective of human
rights. It is obvious to advocates that any choice to wear the veil or
facilitate FGM is simply a coerced choice, shaped by structures of patri-
archy that have been so deeply embedded in culture they have led to
a form of false socialization that disguises the reality of human moral
equality.
Eliminating discriminatory practices of this sort was once called enlight-
enment and civilization. In our era, it is also often about capabilities and
nudging.7 What argument to defend gender discrimination on principle
could be made by any opponent of human rights and expect to be taken
seriously? For human rights advocates, defending gender discrimination on
principle is like defending racism on principle. In a world where human
rights prescribes the limits of legitimate discourse, there is no longer any
language inwhich to do it. These are red lines.Human rights are not a road
to nowhere for their most ardent advocates, they are an often meandering
and frustrating, sometimes slower, sometimes quicker journey toward
a clear and predetermined moral destination. That destination is the legal
right and social capacity, based on natural human moral equality, to make
fully informed autonomous life choices as individuals.
This major historical shift is broadly in line with substantive moral
norms within Western societies. The free societies in Freedom House’s
2015 annual report are overwhelmingly in the West. The focus of global
human rights is in areas such as the ICC, R2P, crimes against humanity,
a world court of human rights, that place civil and political, justice and
protection institutions ﬁrst. The majority of research on human rights
focuses on mental and bodily integrity – civil and political rights – as
well. This is neither contingent nor accidental. These are the rights
which work in alliance with the underlying distribution of social and
economic power worldwide. The social classes who have the money or
the political power – the leverage – to change things only need be
6 C.B.Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1962).
7 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Symposium on Amartya Sen’s Philosophy: 5 Adaptive
Preferences and Women’s Options,” Economics and Philosophy 17 (2001) and Richard
H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and
Happiness (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
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interested in the civil and political rights part of the equation. They want
a voice for themselves domestically and a voice with their like-minded
class compatriots internationally. They don’t need to worry about social
and economic rights because they can produce and consume in the
private sector, which gives them access to all the goods and services
they need.
As for cultural rights, I would argue these are essentially incomprehen-
sible within themainstream global human rights regime (hence the lack of
attention they receive). They are anathema to individual rights, fre-
quently the problem not the solution, and even if they can be made
conceptually coherent, they must still be anchored in the ﬁnal analysis
on individual claims and entitlements, and so they are always trumped by
individual rights. The same is broadly true for group rights claims as well.
As Samuel Moyn has argued, the classic group right – to national self-
determination – was largely killed off by the switch in the 1970s toward
the classical conception of civil and political rights.8 That this coincided
with the uptake by Western middle classes and governments of human
rights ideas is not incidental. This is why human rights research has
discovered that human rights are best observed in the places that need
them least.9 In rights-observing societies, the public/private split and the
primacy in principle of the individual, the distinctive features of modern
liberalism, aremarked. These are constitutively liberal spaces.10 And they
have exported and institutionalized that liberalism.
There is evidence, however, that these liberal, mainly European, states
are losing inﬂuence in organizations such as the United Nations that they
still do somuch to fund.11 Leaving aside the ongoing problems associated
with the Euro after 2008, and fallout from Brexit and the election of
Donald Trump, decreases in European defense spending represent
a trend dating back to the end of the Cold War (as a share of GDP, for
8 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Boston: Harvard/Belknap
Press, 2010).
9 EmilieHafner-Burton,MakingHumanRights a Reality (New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 2013).
10 The metaphysical basis for this political ideology is too large a subject for analysis here;
sufﬁce it to say that the urge to rid justice of its political foundations to enhance legitimacy
must co-exist with the reality that it is only as a political compromise that documents such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gained assent in the ﬁrst place. See
Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most we can Hope For?”
Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004), and on the problematic nature of the
classic “human rights as moral rights” story, see Joseph Raz, “Human Rights without
Foundations,” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 14 (2007).
11 See RichardGowan, “Who IsWinning onHumanRights at the UN?”European Council on
Foreign Relations, September 2012; and RichardGowan and Franziska Brantner, “The EU
and Human Rights at the UN: 2011 Review,” European Council on Foreign Relations, at:
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR39_UN_UPDATE_2011_MEMO_AW.pdf.
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example, the UK’s defense spending fell from 4.4 percent to 2.2 percent
from 1989 to 2008, France’s from 3.7 percent to 2.3 percent and
Germany’s from 2.9 percent to 1.3 percent).12 It was still falling in all
three in 2014.13 In a recent article in International Affairs, Douglas
Webber argues that there is a clear decline in Europe’s military and
economic power, which has inevitably weakened its capacity to inﬂuence
world events, as revealed starkly in Crimea (and Syria and Ukraine).
In Syria, in particular, the evisceration of international humanitarian
law by the Assad government and by Russia has been unchecked by
European protest. Even though Europe’s soft power retains potency, un-
backed by hard power it will further lose effectiveness, Webber claims.14
Freedom House recently reported an eleventh successive year of
declining freedom worldwide, civil liberties and political rights being the
key variables it measures annually to make this assessment.15 Although
until 2006 there had been three decades of increase in the number of
democracies globally, the world has since then, argues Larry Diamond,
entered a period of “democratic recession.”16 This recession has several
aspects: more democratic breakdowns, declining quality of democracy in
some pivotal states, deepening authoritarianism in others, and established
democracies that “increasingly seem to be performing poorly and to lack
the will and self-conﬁdence to promote democracy effectively abroad.”17
The United States is front and center when it comes to lack of will,
according toDiamond.Not only are its own democratic structures under-
performing, but it has lost the conﬁdence or will internationally to pursue
liberal reforms. This will surely only get worse under President Trump.
12 Fabio Liberti, Defence Spending in Europe: Can We Do Better Without Spending More?
(Notre Europe, 2001), 16, at: http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/policy46_ﬂiberti_en
.pdf?pdf=ok.
13 The Economist, “Global defence spending,” (February 2015), at: www.economist.com
/news/economic-and-ﬁnancial-indicators/21643167-global-defence-spending?fsrc=scn/
tw/te/ed/pe/globaldefencespending.
14 Douglas Webber, “Declining Power Europe? The Evolution of the European Union’s
World Power in the Early 21st Century,” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015). See also
Christopher Hill’s discussion of the decline in importance of theUK and France globally:
“Powers of a Kind: The Anomalous Position of France and the United Kingdom in
World Politics,” International Affairs 92, no. 2 (2016).
15 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2017,” at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
16 Larry Diamond, “Facing up to the Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no.
1, January 2015.
17 Diamond, “Facing up to the Democratic Recession,” p. 144. Diamond distinguishes
liberal democracies from electoral democracies, the former restricted to those scoring 1
or 2 on the FreedomHouse scale. In other words, to assess the state of democracy, rights
and liberties, along with transparency and the rule of law, are central elements, conﬁrm-
ing the link between rights and democracy.
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Indeed, even before Trump, the United States, the engine for Western
inﬂuence after 1945, was itself unsure about its strategic direction. It now
faces more competition than it has since the 1980s from global rivals.18
Attempts to shift its strategic focus to Asia have meant demanding more
“burden sharing” from Europeans (and others).19 This is a relative not
absolute decline. If we take as the measure of economic power per capita
GDP, not the absolute size of the economy, the United States is hugely
ahead of China, as well as dwarﬁng all other powers in terms of its military
spending.20 According to The Economist, the United States in 2014 spent
$581 billion on defense, compared with second-placed China at
$129 billion.21 But this was a decline in US defense spending. In Saudi
Arabia spendingwent upby 21percent, followedbyChina (up9.7 percent)
and Russia (up 8.3 percent). Russia spends more of its GDP per capita on
defense than the United States, the US’s share of global defense spending
having fallen from 47 percent in 2010 to 38 percent in 2014.
This would seem to be consistent with the broader feelings of many
Americans. After Iraq and Afghanistan, record numbers now say they
want the United States to let other countries get on with their own
business with less US intervention, “shared leadership” being a better
model for them than hegemony.22 And one of President Trump’s key
campaign promises was to put the national interests of the United States
above any other consideration. This is troubling because on key human
rights issues, it is often American diplomatic involvement that makes the
difference – Sri Lankan war crimes investigations and action to prevent
global anti-blasphemy laws just two recent examples.23 It is difﬁcult to
18 On the decline or otherwise of American power, see Christopher Layne, “TheWaning of
U.S. Hegemony – Myth or Reality? A Review Essay,” International Security 34, no. 1
(2009). See also Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the
United States Is Not Destined to Decline (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012);
Robert Kagan, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” National Review,
January 2012; Robert D. Kaplan,Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American
Power (New York: Random House, 2010); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2009).
19 “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly,”
September 24, 2013.
20 Robert J Lieber, “The rise of the BRICS and American primacy,” International Politics,
pp. 1–18, 2014.
21 The Economist, “Global defence spending,” (February 2015).
22 Pew Research Center, “Americans: Disengaged, feeling less respected, but still see US as
world’s military superpower,” at: www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/01/americans-
disengaged-feeling-less-respected-but-still-see-u-s-as-worlds-military-superpower/.
23 Ronak D. Desai, “Tensions rise between the United States and Sri Lanka over human
rights,”Huff Post Politics, April 28, 2014: www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/ronak-d-desai/a-row-
emerges_b_4859375.html; Nina Shea, “An anti-blasphemy measure laid to rest,”
National Review, March 31, 2011: www.nationalreview.com/article/263450/anti-
blasphemy-measure-laid-rest-nina-shea.
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imagine coordinated action against ISIS without the United States as the
principal military and diplomatic leader, for example.
2 Human Rights in a Post-Western World
In any post-Western world, should that emerge,Western states, particularly
Europe – if it remains united – and most obviously the United States, will
remain highly inﬂuential. Post-Westernmeansmore precisely post-Western
hegemony. The West simply will not remain as inﬂuential. How could it,
with the rise of China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, to give just four
examples? China’s strategic position on the Security Council, for instance,
gives it great leverage and has perhaps even emboldened Russia in pursuing
amore confrontational foreign policy (e.g., over Syria). Given that there are
major problems with human rights compliance even thoughWestern states
have dominated the international system for more than a century, it is not
a stretch to hypothesize that this situation is only likely to get worse.
If Europe does decline in inﬂuence, this will only reveal the degree to
which “the West” has been disproportionately dependent on American
power. Certainly from the end of the Cold War to maybe the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, it made sense to speak of world politics as unipolar, and of the
United States as enjoying a “unipolar moment.”24 What we are experien-
cing now is a shift away from that toward either bipolarity or a qualiﬁed sort
of multipolarity.25What might the implications of such a shift be? If the gap
in power is big enough, the hegemon – or, under bipolarity, the major
powers – have latitude for more expansive foreign policies. They can, in
brief, afford to spend diplomatic capital on issues such as human rights
which arenot primary to national security. As the gap narrows, and as power
comes to be in shorter supply, it must be reserved for vital interests and it is
rare, aspirational rhetoric apart, that threats to human rights elsewhere
represent threats to national security. Moreover, as dominant powers lose
inﬂuence, that power is being dispersed to others (otherwise major powers
would retain their relative advantage). Other things being equal, some
medium-sized and even small powers might now drive a harder bargain
for being an alliance member or refraining from joining a rival grouping.
Thus, the shift to multipolarity may usher in a world where diverse norms
buck the trend to isomorphism.26 Think Central Asia and ASEAN.
24 William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1
(1999): 5–41.
25 Or, in Richard Haass’s view, “nonpolarity.” See Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What
Will Follow US Dominance?” in Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008).
26 Peter J Katzenstein (ed) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and John Boli and
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For example, at a February 2015 White House conference on combat-
ting violent extremism, President Obama’s invited audience included the
Egyptian foreign minister and the prosecutor general of Kazakhstan.
Other attendees included ofﬁcials from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and
Uganda. The president stressed the importance of democracy and free-
dom in defeating terrorism, but the conference in reality highlighted the
need for the US to get cooperation from governments that a Human
Rights First spokesperson described as “part of the problem.”27 Human
Rights Watch’s chief, Kenneth Roth, called the president “Obama the
disappointment.”28 In a multipolar world, these are new realities, and
poor human rights compliance is not a deal breaker. It is not the 1980s, or
indeed the 1990s (when US power was preponderant). The narrow self-
interested focus of President Trump’s foreign policy aims will likely
seriously exacerbate this drift. His admiration for authoritarian leaders
just compounds the problem.
Do global norms need a backer of last resort? Neorealists and many
neoliberals have always thought so. Charles Kupchan says of the future
that it will beNo One’s World. China, as well as India, Russia, and Brazil,
will challenge rules and institutions that do not meet their interests.29
There is no reason why mutual interests cannot be realized through
norms in such a world. The question is whether a global liberal normative
regime will be conceived of as mutually beneﬁcial by a sufﬁcient number
of major powers. Customary international law is based on state practice,
suggesting that if state practice changes – and sovereignty over the treat-
ment of one’s own citizens in opposition to R2P is re-afﬁrmed – then
customary international law will have turned away from human rights.
Human rights advocates will argue this is just bad law, or no law at all.30
But is it? The breaking of a customary norm is also potentially the begin-
ning of a new norm.31 In other words, it is only an assumption
George M Thomas (eds) Constructing World Culture (California: Stanford University
Press, 1999).
27 Peter Baker and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “On Terror, Gentle Hand or Iron Fist,” New York
Times (February 2015), at: www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/world/obama-extremism-
summit.html?emc=edit_th_20150220&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=18548227&_r=0.
28 Kenneth Roth, “Obama the Disappointment,” Human Rights WatchMarch 4, 2014, at:
www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/03/obama-disappointment.
29 Charles A. Kupchan, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global
Turn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
30 Bringing to mind the Hart–Fuller debate of 1958 on whether law to be law must have
progressive content in the broadly Kantian sense of morality. Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism
and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review 71, no. 4 (1958):
636. H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,”Harvard Law
Review 71, no. 4 (1958): 599.
31 Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1971), p. 97.
294 Stephen Hopgood
underwritten by liberal teleology that after more than a century of huma-
nitarian and human rights law, customary international law is perma-
nently about protecting individuals from harm, whether as civilians in war
or as regular citizens.
John Ikenberry in Liberal Leviathan is more optimistic than Kupchan.
Because rules and institutions are a more cost effective way of using
material power to prevail, China will eventually accept the international
order and work within it, he argues, the US-led international system’s
relatively open naturemaking it possible to accommodate such a vast new
rising power.32 Rule-based orders are more legitimate than non-rule-
based ones, Ikenberry says, and therefore easier and cheaper to control
because they operate on the basis of consent rather than coercion. But
here the word “liberal” has a very narrow remit. It means support for
institutions that foster cooperation on issues such as trade, security, and
arms proliferation, not support for broader norms about human rights (or
potentially even democracy). For expansive liberalism, the end of
Western hegemony means no one state or group of states can offer
sufﬁcient incentives or punishments to ensure compliance on issues that
are not vital interests.33 In the American case speciﬁcally, US–China
strategic competition is likely to be more central to US foreign policy
than human rights concerns about South East Asian states like Vietnam
and Thailand and even Myanmar, whose support is key to the strategy of
containing China.
One model for a world of diverse norms, where human rights are less
dominant, is legal pluralism – that is, co-existent legal regimes. This raises
the “red line” question. Negotiated compromises on the basis of the
interpretation of doctrine are one thing. Sources of agreement with
human rights-like sentiments can be found in major religious texts and
cultural traditions. But it cannot be the case that for human rights advo-
cates the conversation with religions and cultural rights, even with social
and economic rights, has no red lines in everyday social life. If there are no
such inviolable borders, how are disputes between traditional and human
rights authorities to be reconciled? In favor of the status quo? This would
privilege all sorts of rights-violating norms: e.g., FGM, rape in marriage,
violence against LGBT people. Of course, FGM must end, like the veil
must go and domestic violence must cease. If, that is, the classic concep-
tion is to be realized. It seems to be an open-ended conversation, but it is
not. For activists this is very deﬁnitely the road to somewhere. At most,
32 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
pp. 345–7.
33 See, for a counter view, Hafner-Burton,Making Human Rights a Reality.
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a few mildly pragmatic compromises might be made – using subtler
means such as two-speed processes, nudges and gentle persuasion, and
education programs, to improve human rights outcomes. But the princi-
ples at issue, the ends to be pursued, are in no sense negotiable – the
priority of the individual as a self-conscious and independent moral
person is the very foundation of the human rights project.
But this clear view of what human rights are is less and less consensual.
Pointing to the law only takes us so far in a world of ambiguous compli-
ance. What human rights entail is contested by governments and within
societies. Even when public opinion as a whole is in favor of human rights,
this tells us little about speciﬁc cases. One example is in areas where
a counter-claim in the language of rights can be made, such as the rights
of the unborn child – that is, the right to life – versus reproductive rights.
Another is between property rights and equality rights. A third is where
different kinds of freedom rights clash – between free expression and
minority rights in areas like religious freedom, for example. In these
cases, people on both sides try to play their trump cards. Then there is
a more pernicious form of rights deployment that ﬂourishes when the
opponents of change use the language of rights to defend and promote
practices that are not consistent with the basic idea of individual rights
underlying the classic conception. In some cases, rights are even used to
defend illiberal causes.34
ASEAN, for example, passed a human rights declaration which local
human rights groups condemned as an “anti-human rights declaration.”35
China’s response to theUN’s 2014 report onNorthKorea, which recorded
“unspeakable atrocities,”was: “Of course we cannot accept this unreason-
able criticism. We believe that politicizing human rights issues is not con-
ducive towards improving a country’s human rights.We believe that taking
human rights issues to the International Criminal Court is not helpful to
improving a country’s human rights situation.”36
In 2012, Russia promoted and passed a resolution on traditional values
at the Human Rights Council, which put forward in the name of human
rights notions about nation and family that are clearly at odds with the
classic conception of human rights in that they deny individuals their veto
over authority (the Russian Orthodox Church’s position on human rights
34 Cliff Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012).
35 Human Rights Watch, “Civil Society Denounces Adoption of Flawed ASEAN Human
Rights Declaration,” at: www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/19/civil-society-denounces-
adoption-ﬂawed-asean-human-rights-declaration.
36 Reuters, “China Rejects UN Criticism in North Korea Report, No Comment on Veto,”
February 18, 2014, available at: www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/18/us-china-korea-
north-idUSBREA1H0E220140218.
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mirrors this resolution).37 Norway’s Helsinki Committee says of the
Russian resolution:
During recent years, a Russian-sponsored initiative at the UN Human Rights
Council has been targeting core tenets of international human rights: their uni-
versality, their unconditional nature, and their challenge to traditions that uphold
discrimination and intolerance. The proponents of the initiative have camou-
ﬂaged it as laying out new ways of promoting human rights. Traditional values
of humankind are a tool to strengthen and underpin human rights at the local
level, they claim. In reality, the initiative threatens to destroy consensus among
the states of the world on how they should honor their human rights obligations.38
But the elasticity of rights concepts and the interpretability of rights claims,
let alone the caveats that exist even in UDHR Article 29 about “morality,
public order and the general welfare in democratic societies,” facilitate such
a challenge to the previously hegemonic understanding of rights. Politically
speaking, human rights norms are now “essentially contested concepts”
where the phrases “this is a human right” and “human rights give rise to the
following binding obligations” are not just disagreements about how
a concept is properly used but about what the concept entails in a more
foundational sense.39 The resolution of these struggles at the international
level is not tobe found indiscursive interactionbut in the political leverage –
the power – alliances canmuster in global institutions. As power is increas-
ingly dispersed, the chances of forging a global consensus recede. This is,
I would argue, the coming human rights future.
The extreme version of politicization manifests itself most strongly in
the cases of China and Russia. Rather than ﬁnd ways to accommodate
rights, they have both set themselves up broadly in opposition to the
global human rights regime.40 In the Russian case, this has led to active
hostility toward human rights as a whole, and foreign-funded human
rights groups in particular.41 Even when China has used human rights
language, it does so in ways that emphasize social and economic over
civil and political rights, and which stress sovereignty and national
37 See, for example, Cai Wilkinson, “Putting “Traditional Values” into Practice: The Rise
and Contestation of Anti-homopropaganda Laws in Russia,” Journal of Human Rights 13
(2014): 363–79.
38 Norwegian Helsinki Committee, “Russia’s Traditional Values Initiative Result [sic] in
Abuse at Domestic Level,” June 20, 2014, at: http://nhc.no/no/nyheter/Russia’s
+traditional+values+initiative+result+in+abuse+at+domestic+level.b7C_wlnKY2.ips.
39 W B Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol.
56 (1955), pp. 167–98.
40 In “Facing up to the Democratic Recession,” Diamond describes Russian-Chinese
collaboration within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an “axis of cynical
cooperation,” p. 151.
41 Tanya Lokshina, “Russia’s Backward Roll,” Human Rights Watch (July 2014), at: www
.hrw.org/news/2014/07/30/russias-backward-roll.
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self-determination. It is also adept at exposing Western hypocrisy by
producing reports that identify human rights abuses in the West.42 All
of which does little for the legal protections that individual rights are
meant to provide. In other words, human rights language might be
acceptable where it is diluted of all signiﬁcance, and resisted or ignored
where it might still carry weight.43
Moving away from unipolarity, and from the hegemony of Western
power, opens up space for alternative international norms. China and
Russia have led the way in diffusing strategies and mechanisms by which
to institutionalize authoritarian rule more effectively.44 This creates
room, especially in terms of legitimacy, for the new authoritarians to
counter human rights, whether through rejection, evasion, or co-
optation. To see this as merely a transient phenomenon, we would
have to believe that Russia and China will at some point reverse them-
selves and embrace human rights norms at the international level. But
the authoritarian toolkit they are exporting will blunt domestic capacity
building further, thus making it even harder for rights advocates to make
an impression on powerful, illiberal governments.
There are many obvious forms of pushback by states, such as the use of
increasingly coercive methods to suppress dissent in Egypt, Turkey,
Bahrain, Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan, Venezuela, the Philippines, and
Saudi Arabia, to name just a few cases. These methods are endemic in
Central Asia and parts of the Middle East, as well as throughout many
parts of Africa. Freedom House describes this as “the twilight of modern
authoritarianism,” arguing that the semblance of concessions (e.g., plur-
alistic media, political competition, rule of law) that anti-democratic
regimes made for several years around the turn of the century – while
the impact of unipolarity could still be felt – has now dropped away and
full authoritarianism is returning.45 Freedom House’s 2015 report –
which marked this shift – was titled “Return to the Iron Fist.”46 With
42 Xiaoyu Pu, “Can China be a Normative Power?”OpenGlobalRights ((June 2013) at: www
.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/xiaoyu-pu/can-china-be-normative-power.
43 Tianzhao Yang and Jiangnan Zhu, “Collective Apathy: Nationalism and Human Rights
in China,” OpenGlobalRights (March 2014) at: www.opendemocracy.net/openglobal
rights/tianzhao-yang-jiangnan-zhu/collective-apathy-nationalism-and-human-rights-in-
china. Yang and Zhu suggest China might be more supportive of a language like “the
efﬁcient administration of justice” rather than human rights.
44 Diamond, “Facing up to the Democratic Recession,” p. 152.
45 Tyler Roylance, “The Twilight of Modern Authoritarianism,” Freedom House (October
2014), at: https://freedomhouse.org/blog/twilight-modern-authoritarianism#
.VG7vnIfZfdk
46 Freedom House, Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist (2015), at: www
.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ﬁles/01152015_FIW_2015_ﬁnal.pdf.
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President Trump’s labeling of the American press as an “enemy of the
people,” authoritarianism has reached a new level of intensity.
More subtle methods can also be used, to control rather than sup-
press human rights activism. For example, manipulating funds is
a strategy for resistors. Former United Nations human rights commis-
sioner, Navi Pillay, warned in 2013 that human rights budgets were not
keeping up with needs – the ﬂow of money to ﬁnance wider human
rights surveillance an obvious weak point in a world where the West no
longer wants to pay.47 India and Russia, to take two cases, also use laws
on foreign donors to restrict ﬂows of money to indigenous human rights
NGOs. They can easily adopt similar policies internationally to control
donations to organizations that propagate causes with which they dis-
agree, and they will not be alone in doing so. In other cases, such as
Egypt, denying visas to major human rights ﬁgures is another
strategy.48
Western hypocrisy does not help.Hungary’s “illiberal democracy” is an
example from the Western bloc where state authoritarianism is growing,
while many see Australia’s immigration policy as a violation of human
rights.49 The Obama administration may have repudiated the Bush
administration’s interpretation of the applicability of the Convention
Against Torture, but in the case of extraterritoriality and cruel, inhumane,
or degrading treatment, the president was reluctant, despite the advice of
State Department lawyers, to repeal Bush’s interpretation in all cases.50
President Obama was adept at lawfare himself when it came to issues
such as targeted killing and Guantanamo.51 And President Trump has
openly advocated a return to torture, despite the opposition of his
Defense Secretary (whose view, the new president says, he will
47 OHCHR Report 2012, at: www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2012/web_en/pages/int
roduction.html
48 Reuters, “Human Rights Watch Staff Denied Entry to Egypt,” The Guardian (August
2014), at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/human-rights-watch-staff-egypt.
49 Kati Marton, “Hungary’s Authoritarian Descent,” New York Times (Nov. 2014), at:
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/opinion/hungarys-authoritarian-descent.html?_r=2,
and Helen Davidson and Ben Doherty, “Australia’s ‘Abusive Refugee Policies’
Criticized in Damning International Report,” The Guardian (January 2016), at: www
.theguardian.com/law/2016/jan/27/australias-abusive-refugee-policies-criticised-in-da
mning-international-report.
50 Jack Goldsmith, “The debate about the extraterritorial scope of the torture Convention’s
provisions on cruelty is (almost certainly) not about USG interrogation policy,” Lawfare,
October 24, 2014, at: www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/the-debate-about-the-
extraterritorial-scope-of-the-torture-conventions-provisions-on-cruelty-is-almost-cer
tainly-not-about-usg-interrogation-policy/.
51 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and
Will,” International New York Times, May 29, 2012: www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/
obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?emc=eta1.
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respect).52 In the UK case, the president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta,
previously indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity, cited the
British government’s ambivalence about human rights as evidence that
the whole human rights regime itself lacks legitimacy.53 The ISIS ﬁghters
holding hostages in Syria dressed their captives in Guantanamo-style
orange jumpsuits and water-boarded American hostage James Foley
before beheading him.54
The use by the United States and the United Kingdom of massively
intrusive surveillance is a further sign that authoritarian government is not
conﬁned to the non-West. Control of cyber-space is an issue where China
andRussia have led theway, followed by awhole range of other states who
fear this tool of open communication and dissent. But the response of the
American and British governments – to preach open internet commu-
nications while collecting masses of data on their own and foreign citizens
without oversight – seems to many an egregious example of hypocrisy.
3 Social Ambivalence
The picture I have drawn so far might suggest that pro-human rights
populations are trapped inside illiberal sovereign containers, particularly
outside the West. But the story at the social level is more complex than
that. Human rights have always been a problem for both the left and the
right.55 Marx argued in On the Jewish Question in 1844 that political
freedom was a poor substitute for economic freedom. Critics of major
international interventions – especially Kosovo, but also Libya – have
seen human rights as the vanguard of a new kind of NATO-led Western
imperialism.56 Resistance from the right comes from advocates of
52 KristinaWong, “Mattis still opposes torture despite Trump comment,”TheHill (January
2017), at: http://thehill.com/policy/defense/316356-mattis-remains-opposed-to-torture-
pentagon-says.
53 Adam Wagner, “Kenyan President uses Tory Human Rights Plans to Defend was
Crimes Charges,” UK Human Rights Blog (October 2014), at: http://ukhumanrights
blog.com/2014/10/24/kenyan-president-uses-tory-human-rights-plans-to-defend-war
-crimes-charges/.
54 Rukmini Callimachi, “The Horror before the Beheadings,” New York Times (October
2014), at: www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/world/middleeast/horror-before-the-
beheadings-what-isis-hostages-endured-in-syria.html.
55 See, for example, Costas Douzinas.The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the
Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), and Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy
of Antiliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
56 Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity: War, Law, and Global Order (London: Continuum,
2002), Jean Bricmont, Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell
War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2007); Robin Blackburn (ed.), The Imperialism
of Human Rights, New Left Review, special issue 234 (1999); Ray Kiely, “Intervention:
Imperialism or human rights?” OpenDemocracy, October 20, 2014, at: www
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sovereignty and nationalism (the many right-of-center European and
American politicians skeptical about immigration, for example) and also
from those who see rights as a threat to traditional social values and as
heralds of a more bureaucratized, rule-bound, and disenchanted world
(e.g., Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt). Rights here are seen as constraining
national community, power, andmission, as undermining the traditional,
embedded, and speciﬁc norms and customs that give a nation a unique
identity over time.Nations become soft, engineered, bland, andweak, the
rule of law overwhelms the rule of men, and manifest destiny evaporates
in a cloud of bureaucracy, constraint, and mediocrity.57 One obvious
contemporary example comes from the United Kingdom, where
a particular kind of anti-immigration nationalist sentiment has taken
hold (fueling Brexit), pushing right-wing politicians to advocate rejection
of the European Court of Human Rights (for putting rights before public
order and national security) and even to demand repeal of the United
Kingdom’s own Human Rights Act.58
There are other objections to human rights – theCatholic Church and the
Muslim Brotherhood together contesting women’s rights at the
Commission on the Status of Women, for example.59 In terms of LGBT
rights, recent setbacks in India, Jamaica, and particularly Uganda (and
increasingly throughout Sub-Saharan Africa), let alone in Russia, show
how little impact decades of human rights work has made to non-
discrimination on the basis of sexuality.60 Pope Francis has been savvy
about counter-posing poverty and abortion and asking which should be
the priority (while making more liberal gestures toward the role of women
and LGBT people in religious life).61 The language of rights can also prove
.opendemocracy.net/ray-kiely/intervention-imperialism-or-human-rights. Slavoj Zizek,
“Against Human Rights,” New Left Review 34 (2005), pp. 115–31.
57 Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism.
58 Jon Henley, “Why is the European Court of Human Rights Hated by the UK Right?”
The Guardian (Dec 2013), at: www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/22/britain-european
-court-human-rights. The strategy document in which any future Conservative govern-
ment promises to scrap the UK’s Human Rights Act is available here: www.theguardian
.com/politics/interactive/2014/oct/03/conservatives-human-rights-act-full-document.
59 Jill Filipovic, “UN Commission on the Status of Women Unmasks the Enemies of
Equality,” The Guardian, March 18, 2013:, at www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/mar/18/un-commission-status-women-enemies-equality.
60 Although for a more nuanced reading which problematizes the “Orientalist” divide this
suggests between the civilized and uncivilized worlds, see Rahul Rao, “The Locations of
Homophobia,” London Review of International Law, vol. 2, no. 2 (2014): 169–99.
In addition, the success of demands for same-sex marriage in the United States, despite
conservative and religious resistance, suggests that LGBT rights might make progress
where they are not seen as antithetical to core social values about the sanctity of marriage.
61 Antonia Blumberg, “In his Speech to Congress, the Pope said 10 Times More about
Poverty than Abortion,” HuffPost Religion (September 2015), at: www.hufﬁngtonpost
.com/entry/pope-congress-poverty_us_56043b2be4b0fde8b0d1a71d.
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ineffective or even counterproductive, necessitating a different approach to
achieving the desired end. In the case of anti-FGM campaigns in Africa, for
instance, we see how a more pragmatic approach is bringing some hope for
improvement, rather than the dogmatic attachment to condemnation in the
language of human rights that has been more prevalent since the 1990s.62
Even when there is progress in situations where religious objections to
human rights remain strong, this may not take place in the way global
human rights advocates expect. KevinWard has shown, for example, that
while the law on LGBT rights is more progressive in South Africa, the
treatment of gay people is signiﬁcantly worse there than inUganda, where
the law is more regressive.63
According to one recent report on Indonesia, meanwhile, even though
abortion remains technically illegal, it is tolerated both socially and reli-
giously (Islamic authorities beingmore progressive here than the Catholic
Church in the nearby Philippines).64 But Indonesian politicians are loath
to deal with the question formally, by changing the law, for fear that they
will politicize the issue and thereby lose support (hardening positions and
eroding the unspoken compromise that exists). Yet many of those who
support this de facto pro-abortion status quo nevertheless do not want to
advance what they call “Western values,” a term connoting a loosening of
public morals and validation for sexually uninhibited lifestyles. These are
seen as a threat to norms of social propriety in Indonesia even though
sexual and cultural freedom is a core element of human rights.65
Systematic data on social support for human rights is scarce, but global
opinion polls certainly suggest there is widespread rhetorical enthusiasm
for the idea of human rights.66 As the global middle class grows in an era
62 UNICEF, “Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Statistical Overview and Exploration
of the Dynamics of Change,” July 2013, at: www.unicef.org/media/ﬁles/FGCM_Lo_res
.pdf; Gerry Mackie and John LeJeune, “Social Dynamics of Abandonment of Harmful
Practices: ANewLook at the Theory,”UNICEF InnocentiWorking Paper, 2008, available
at: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~gmackie/documents/UNICEF.pdf.
63 Kevin Ward, “Religious Institutions and Actors and Religious Attitudes to Homosexual
Rights: South Africa and Uganda,” in Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites (eds.)
Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for
Decriminalisation and Change (London: School of Advanced Study, 2013), pp. 409–27.
64 TomHundley, “Southeast Asia: ‘ACertainMedical Procedure,’’’ Pulitzer Center on Crisis
Reporting, February 12, 2014, available at: http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/asia-
philippines-indonesia-abortion-underground-shame.
65 Hundley, “Southeast Asia: ‘A certain medical procedure.’”
66 World Public Opinion.Org, “Poll Finds Strong International Consensus on Human
Rights,” (Dec. 2011), at: http://worldpublicopinion.net/polls-ﬁnd-strong-international-
consensus-on-human-rights/. For more nuanced data, see James Ron, David Crow and
Shannon Golden, “The Struggle for a Truly Grassroots Human Rights Movement,”
OpenGlobalRights (June 2013), at: www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/james-ron
-david-crow-shannon-golden/struggle-for-truly-grassroots-human-rights-move.
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of globalization, this support for liberal democracy would seem to mirror
one of modernization theory’s main assumptions – that liberalism (and
therefore human rights) follows capitalism. In a classic of historical
sociology, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington
Moore encapsulates this thesis in the phrase “No bourgeois, no
democracy.”67 It is the bourgeoisie – the town and city dwelling, com-
mercially active middle classes – who advance democracy as a way to
protect their property and person from state power and to promote their
interests. This democratic struggle seeks three things: to check arbitrary
rulers, to replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones, and to “obtain
a share for the underlying population in the making of rules.”68 These
demands are at the heart of the human rights project.
But how interested are themiddle classes (the new bourgeoisie) beyond
acquiring basic civil and political rights? These narrow ﬁrst-generation
rights reinforce middle-class advantage, serving as both a constraint on
elite power and on demands for redistribution from below (e.g., property
rights). Western human rights supporters (not the more highly motivated
activists and advocates) may be happy working on the rights of others
overseas (on issues such as child rights and sex trafﬁcking) and less keen
on turning the human rights lens on what is happening within their own
societies. This position is already to some degree mirrored by the rising
middle classes of Asia and Africa. It is not good news for economic, social,
and cultural rights. As Moore points out, those who provide support for
the revolution, those who lead it, and those who beneﬁt from it may be
three separate sets of people.69 As he says, the price of a system that
embeds bourgeois values may be “the perpetuation of a large amount of
‘tolerable’ abuse – which is mainly tolerable for those who proﬁt by the
system.”70
To take an obvious example, as Martin Gilens has shown, the top
20 percent of afﬂuent Americans tend to be more liberal than the general
population on religious and moral issues (including gay rights and abor-
tion), but more conservative than the wider populace on tax, regulation,
and welfare.71 Very wealthy Americans oppose redistribution of wealth or
income by largemargins.72 The one segment of this wealthy demographic
that is slightly more in favor of regulation, environmental protection,
67 Barrington Moore Jnr, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London:
Penguin, 1966), p. 418.
68 Ibid., p. 414. 69 Ibid., p. 427. 70 Ibid., p. 426.
71 Martin Gilens, Afﬂuence and Inﬂuence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); also Benjamin I Page, Larry Bartels,
and Jason Seawright, “Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans,”
Perspectives on Politics, v. 11, no. 1 (2013): 51–73.
72 Page, Bartels and Seawright, “Democracy”: 63.
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climate change action, and economic aid abroad are professionals – spe-
ciﬁcally, doctors and lawyers (for whom income rather than wealth
remains important).73 Further work by Gilens and Benjamin Page has
added to these ﬁndings by showing that the economic elite has a
signiﬁcantly higher inﬂuence on public policy than the average citizen.74
And a recent analysis byThomas Edsall of American voters in 2015 shows
that even well-paid, well-educated, upper-middle-class Democrats are
conservative when it comes to redistribution. As he puts it: “These voters
are repelled by a social conservatism that is anti-abortion, anti-gay rights
and anti-women’s rights. But they are not eager to see their taxes
raised.”75
This is only a rough proxy, of course, for middle-class human rights
support. It suggests, however, that whether or not this elite supports civil
and political rights abroad, it does not support economic and social
rights domestically – quite the opposite. The afﬂuent represent the
apex of the middle class, of course: it is far wider and more diverse in
its view than this picture suggests. In the UK case, for example, opinions
on the suggestion by the Conservative party that Britain might withdraw
from the European Court of Human Rights split almost entirely along
party lines in polls (the right favors withdrawal, the liberals and the
liberal-left do not).76
And this is not purely a Western phenomenon. Joshua Kurlantzick has
argued, building on studies by Freedom House and others, that democ-
racy seems to be in retreat elsewhere because the middle classes in many
developing countries have taken fright at the implications of democratiza-
tion for their own security, wealth, and inﬂuence.77 Other analysts have
seen middle-class support for authoritarian military government in Egypt
in the same light.78Wemight even see cash giveaways to public workers in
Saudi Arabia as a way to stem support for any form of political
73 Page, Bartels and Seawright, “Democracy”: 65.
74 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics, v. 12, no. 3 (2014):
564–81. See also Joseph E Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (New York: WW Norton and
Co, 2012).
75 Thomas B. Edsall, “The Problem with Middle-class Populism,” New York Times
(February 2015), at: www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/the-problem-with-middle-
class-populism.html?emc=eta1&_r=0.
76 William Jordan, “Support for Tory Human Rights Plans falls along Party Lines,”
YouGov.UK (October 2014), at: http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/10/08/support-tory-
human-rights-plans-falls-along-party-/.
77 Joshua Kurlantzick,Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide
Decline of Representative Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
78 MagedMandour, “Liberalismwithout Democracy: The Case of Egypt,”OpenDemocracy
(February 2015), at: www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/maged-mandour/liberal
ism-without-democracy-case-of-egypt.
304 Stephen Hopgood
liberalization at a time of regime transition.79 More generally, Landman
and Larizza have shown that income inequality correlates strongly with
increased human rights abuses, particularly in terms of personal integrity
rights.80
Tunisia might be one bright spot that provides a counter-example,
having evolved more of a middle class under President Ben Ali’s dicta-
torship and thereby laying some of the ground work for democracy.81
Long-term middle-class pressure was important in chipping away at the
foundations of the regime before the self-immolation of Mohamed
Bouazizi sparked the Arab Spring.82 Iran might be another positive
case on issues such as the death penalty.83 But in major cases like
China we see a compact between the wealth-creators and the state
where enrichment is the price for accepting a lack of political
freedom.84 And in India, middle-class support for Prime Minister
Narendra Modi is allied to a degree of skepticism about the political
process (linked to anger at corruption) and a renewed emphasis on
a Hindu ethno-religious nationalism (contra human rights) which has
emerged precisely as an antidote to the materialism that new wealth has
brought.85 Best-selling analyst of inequality, Thomas Piketty, has even
taken the buoyant Indian middle classes to task for their lack of concern
about inequality.86
This issue lies at the root of problems within the human rights move-
ment more widely. There is a political economy in this movement
79 Ben Hubbard, “Saudi King unleashes a torrent of money as bonuses ﬂow to the masses,”
New York Times (February 2015), at: www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/world/middleeast/
saudi-king-unleashes-a-torrent-as-bonuses-ﬂow-to-the-masses.html?emc=eta1.
80 Todd Landman and Marco Larizza, “Inequality and Human Rights: Who Controls
What, When and How,” International Studies Quarterly 53 (2009).
81 On Tunisia, see, for example, Brian Klaas andMarcel Dirsus, “The Tunisia Model: Did
Tunis win the Arab Spring?” Foreign Affairs (October 2014), at: www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/142290/brian-klaas-and-marcel-dirsus/the-tunisia-model.
82 Eric Goldstein, “A Middle-Class Revolution,” Foreign Policy (January 2011), at: www
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/18/a_middle_class_revolution.
83 Thomas Erdbrink, “Mercy and Social Media Slow the Noose in Iran,” New York Times
(March 2014), at: www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/middleeast/mercy-and-social-
media-slow-the-noose-in-iran.html?emc=edit_th_20140309&nl=todaysheadlines&
nlid=18548227&_r=0.
84 On China, see Kellee Tsai, Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in
Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007) and Yang and Zhu,
“Collective Apathy.”
85 Christophe Jaffrelot, “Modi of the Middle Class,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (March 2014), at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/24/modi-of-middle-
class and Leela Fernandes, India’s New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of
Economic Reform (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).
86 Manu Joseph, “Piketty to India’s Elite: ‘Learn from History,’” New York Times,
December 2015, at: www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/world/asia/thomas-piketty-
inequality-india-mumbai.html?_r=0.
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all the way down that makes it hard for the priorities of the base – the
mass of people at the bottom – to really affect the priorities of global
campaigns. Global human rights is in many ways conservative where
grass-roots human rights work is revolutionary and much more con-
ventionally political. If the people are at the bottom, the money is still at
the top.
Nevertheless, having said all of this, at least two further observa-
tions might be made about the “status quo-oriented middle class”
argument and the sad outlook it predicts for narrowing inequality by
genuinely embracing socioeconomic rights. First, any modern demo-
cratic society cannot sustain itself indeﬁnitely if the majority of the
people are alienated from the fruits of their labor and from access to
wealth. As many Western states are currently discovering, status-quo
politicians are an endangered species, with increasingly angry popu-
lations on the left and the right demanding change. This suggests that
the middle classes will quite possibly be forced into greater efforts at
redistribution than they might otherwise choose.87 Second, middle-
class gains against the state may be hard to achieve and harder to
sustain without strategic engagement and even alliance with key
social interest groups and movements who bring leverage through
numbers.
Indeed, these two points intersect. If themiddle classes need the state
to protect their wealth, having alienated other potential social allies,
they will be weak bargainers when it comes to demanding the state be
more accountable to them and even grant concessions. If the middle
classes seek to ally with broader social forces, against the state, then
they’ll need to cement this alliance by embracing a more widely shared
agenda that better reﬂects the interests of the “have-nots,” including
those who for reasons of identity not wealth may be marginal, as well as
the “haves.”
4 On the Road to Nowhere
There is no longer any hegemonic deﬁnition of what constitutes the
content or foundational authority of human rights, I suggest, the con-
versation now being about diversity, variability, “multiple modernities,”
87 This homogenizes the middle class far too much, obviously, especially where, as in the
United States, the majority of people see themselves as middle class. I am using “middle
class” as a proxy for those – urban, professional, well-salaried with a reasonably signiﬁ-
cant degree of equity wealth (e.g., in property and stocks) and a college or higher
education – who comprise the core of the top, say, 10% of a society in terms of wealth
proﬁle.
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where there are various forms of being modern, not all of which are in full
alignment with the benchmark standards of universal and inalienable
human rights as classically conceived and politically institutionalized.88
In other words, there are no red lines that enjoy universal political support
(even if they seem to enjoy a legal consensus). There is a further issue in
that many of the most pressing human rights issues of our era will involve
acts of private violence (e.g., domestic abuse, sex crimes) and these are
not covered by international law, which remains principally about atrocity
crimes of one sort or another committed by states and their ofﬁcials. And
as I have argued, human rights are not necessarily progressive – their ﬁrst-
generation, civil, and political variant dominates for structural (not tran-
sient) reasons over social and economic, cultural and group rights. This is
a very conditional, class-speciﬁc form of liberal freedom, as Barrington
Moore noted. Better, no doubt, than the alternatives glimpsed under
authoritarianism, but a long way from the aspirations of many human
rights advocates.
In their book The Human Rights Paradox, Steve Stern and Scott Straus
see this conjunction between the universal and local as an irresolvable
tension in all human rights work, each unable to escape the other. They
must learn to co-exist. Rather than “eternal transcendent rights that
emerge after a formative point of historical origin,” Stern and Straus
conceptualize rights as relational (between people, between local and
global), and contextual, giving rise to “a shifting history and future of
urgent fundamental rights attached to the human.”89 Mark Goodale
echoes this, asking why “liberal (or neoliberal) legal and political theory
should continue to prove so foundational when this political choice is no
longer necessary.”90
But this elides perhaps the key problem for a more pragmatic,
diverse, agile, ﬂexible, democratic global human rights movement.
Many human rights advocates, in the West and elsewhere, believe in
a radical moral critique of established authorities from the perspective
of individual entitlements. They have a normative commitment, not
88 S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., Multiple Modernities (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
2005) but also Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and
Pluralist Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2010).
89 Steve Stern and Scott J Straus, “Embracing Paradox: Human Rights in the Global Age,”
in The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents, Stern and Straus (eds.)
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), pp. 10–11.
90 Mark Goodale, Surrendering to Utopia: An Anthropology of Human Rights (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 10. See also Sonia Harris-Short, “International
Human Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25 no. 1
(2003), p. 181.
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a career.91 Moreover, they hold to a version of the “Orientalist” map
that separates the world into areas of concern about rights (e.g., for
LGBT rights, Africa, and the Middle East), and areas where those
rights are better observed (principally in theWest and a few other states
and societies). Where some are skeptical about the lessons to be drawn
from the Pew Center’s ﬁndings on anti-homosexual prejudice, most
human rights advocates would see this map as an accurate reﬂection of
where the needs are greatest in terms of LGBT activism (as one
example).92
In other words, there is a core claim about individual autonomy and
choice that in principle limits the scope of any pragmatic reorientation.
Means might be adaptable, but not ends. To make the journey open-
ended is to put human rights on the road to nowhere (that is, to
“nowhere in particular”). But most human rights activists know the
destination at which they are aiming; they just puzzle and struggle over
how to get there. The power of these rights is in their clear and unequi-
vocal codiﬁcation. They are timeless principles. “Freedom” and “jus-
tice,” as I argued at the outset, can accommodate diverse forms of
realization. But human rights really do have some uncrossable barriers
(red lines, individual trump cards, vetoes) beyond which they can no
longer be called rights in a meaningful way. For advocates, human rights
are on the road to somewhere – e.g., universal gender equality. If this isn’t
where Stern and Straus’s negotiated tension ends up then we cannot be,
for global advocates, talking about human rights any more. But this
inﬂexibility about ends makes human rights politically inept, even counter-
productive, as humanitarians have discovered.93
If global norms do get retrenched, this will reverberate through the
human rights ecosystem. When China says human rights are not
a global norm, or are colonial impositions, or Russia says your inter-
pretation of human rights is not the same as ours but ours is just as
valid, there is no option but to listen. Add to this the constituency of
social conservatives in all societies, the West and non-West, mobilized
and organized to block change even if they cannot prevail, and the angry
leftists who see their lives blighted by globalization, and you have
a recipe for a stalled human rights revolution at best, and for rollback
91 Although much more could be said about this: see Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of
Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), chap. 5.
92 Rao, “The Locations of Homophobia,” pp. 169–171 and the Pew Research Center
Global Attitudes Project, “TheGlobal Divide onHomosexuality,” (June 2013), at: www
.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/
93 Marie-Pierre Allié, “Introduction: Acting at Any Price?” in Claire Magone,
Michaël Neuman, and Fabrice Weissman, eds., Humanitarian Negotiations Revealed:
The MSF Experience (London: Hurst/MSF, 2011), pp. 1–11.
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at worst. Populist leaders have put aspects of both the left and right
critiques together to challenge liberal norms at the national level
throughout the West.
One response to these anxieties has been to forge ahead, increasing the
number of permanent institutions that support human rights (on the
principle that even if the language is in question, the institutions, once
established, are harder to disassemble and will have positive long-term
effects). This is one way to see the proposed Convention on Crimes
Against Humanity – as a capstone to complete the global architecture of
human rights law. And it may well pass, with reservations (if the United
States is to join) or without (if great powers are not to be allowed to dictate
the terms of the treaty). But what difference will it make to the everyday
lives of billions of people living under authoritarian rule or suffering from
endemic forms of private violence, police torture, brutality, or systematic
discrimination?
This rapidly transforming world can be characterized as neo-
Westphalian.94 Global trade and ﬁnance, essential elements of the
afﬂuence of growing powers such as China, as well as collective security
concerns about transport, energy, and weapons, create shared interests
in the preservation of international order. In this sense, India, China,
Brazil, and perhaps even Russia have a stake in the continuation of the
system (as Ikenberry argues). But there is no evidence they want to
expand the hierarchical system of rules and norms centered around
human rights and international justice. Great powers will break their
own rules when it really matters to them. And international law will
always have an element of “indeterminacy” such that competent argu-
ments both for and against certain courses of action can be made.95
From this it is but a short step to competing and even new norms.
There may be what has been called a “structural bias” in favor of the
liberal settlement, but it is precisely the survival of the preconditions
for that bias that I am questioning. Or rather, it will function within
zones of relative peace, security and justice, and not for their borderlands,
which will remain zones of conﬂict, poverty and injustice. These divisions
94 My understanding of NeoWestphalia is less homogeneity, less integration, more compe-
tition, and no universal norms. Jan Zielonka uses the term “neo-Westphalian” in exactly
the opposite sense in the context of EU enlargement; see Jan Zielonka, “Enlargement and
the Finality of European Integration,”Harvard JeanMonnetWorking Paper, symposium
in response to Joschka Fischer, 2000, and Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
95 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, reissue with new epilogue (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power,
Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2016).
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exist within societies as well as between them. What we might have to
give up, for a generation at least, is the idea that the two zones will be
fused into one single glorious, universal, and liberal whole. Embracing
the road to nowhere may seem like a step forward in that the newly
multipolar world must be more about diversity and conversation and
less about uniformity and diktat. But this may also prove to be an
illusion, leaving just the lucky few still traveling the road to somewhere
(most probably a gated community in an afﬂuent suburb).
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